Why Theaterisation May Not Be the Right Path for Indian Armed Forces - An Overview.

Why Theaterisation May Not Be the Right Path for India’s Armed Forces

The debate around theaterisation — the restructuring of India’s Army, Navy, and Air Force into unified theater commands under one commander — has become one of the most pressing topics in Indian defense reforms. On paper, theaterisation promises jointness, synergy, and better warfighting efficiency. But tactically, the reality for India is far more complex. Let’s break it down in simple human terms.

Air Force Perspective: Why Theaterisation Cages Air Power

Air power is not like land or sea power. Armies hold ground, navies secure sea lanes, but air forces are fast, fluid, and mobile. A squadron can strike deep into Pakistan in the morning and be redeployed to Arunachal by night. That mobility is the Air Force’s biggest strength. Theaterisation risks chopping this power into small regional packets, leaving each weaker.

For the IAF, the problems are clear:

• India has only around 30 fighter squadrons, far below the sanctioned 42. Splitting them between different theaters dilutes strength instead of concentrating it.

• Air campaigns succeed when they’re centrally controlled. Kargil and Balakot worked because the IAF had unity of command. If air assets are parceled out to Army-led theater commanders, scarce AWACS or refuellers may be misused.

• Air operations rely on expensive, scarce assets like AWACS, mid-air refuellers, and ISR satellites. These cannot be tied to one region; they need central tasking across the nation.

• Most importantly, the IAF’s doctrine is about shaping the battlefield and striking strategically, not just providing fire support to ground troops. Theaterisation risks reducing the Air Force to a “flying artillery” arm of the Army.

Army Perspective: Added Bureaucracy and Lost Flexibility

At first glance, the Army might seem to gain from theaterisation, since it is the largest service and guards the borders. But on closer look, it could be hurt as well.

• India faces a two-front war threat from China and Pakistan. Theaterisation could tie down forces too rigidly. What if reinforcements are needed across theaters in a crisis? Flexibility would be reduced.

• Each theater would demand its own logistics, artillery, and air defense resources. This duplication wastes money and manpower.

• A new Theater HQ above the Corps and Division levels adds another layer of command. Instead of speeding decisions, it slows them down. In high-tempo operations like Kargil, clarity and speed are everything.

• Current Army commands are already tuned to their regions — like Northern Command for J&K or Eastern Command for China. Tinkering with them risks confusion in war.

Navy Perspective: Breaking Unity of a Mobile Force

The Navy is inherently a single, unified, mobile force. A carrier battle group in the Arabian Sea can sail to the Bay of Bengal in days. Theaterisation threatens this unity.

• The Navy has limited resources: only two carriers, a few nuclear subs, and a finite number of destroyers. Splitting them across theaters weakens both sides.

• Naval strategy is about sea control, sea denial, and dominating choke points like Malacca. Under an Army-led theater system, the Navy risks being reduced to a coastal guard role.

• The Navy’s current Eastern and Western Commands already coordinate effectively under Naval HQ. A new theater system duplicates work without adding value.

• Even the U.S., which has far more resources, ensures the Navy retains autonomy in managing its fleet worldwide. India has far fewer assets, so splitting them makes little sense.

The Core Flaws of Theaterisation for India

Numbers don’t support it. The U.S. can split forces into theaters because it has overwhelming numbers. India, with shortages in all services, cannot.

India’s geography is unique. Two nuclear-armed land borders plus a vast coastline demand flexibility. Copying China or America’s model won’t work.

Doctrinal differences matter. The Army thinks in terms of holding ground, the Navy in terms of sea control, the IAF in terms of air dominance. Forcing one rigid theater model risks reducing each service to a support role instead of preserving its strategic strengths.

What India Actually Needs Instead

• Integrated logistics and procurement: One common logistics chain, joint procurement, and unified training will cut waste and improve efficiency.

• Joint intelligence, cyber, and space commands: Sharing these across services strengthens everyone without breaking their structure.

• Mission-based task forces: Instead of rigid theaters, create flexible joint task forces for contingencies. This keeps services free to train and operate by their doctrines while ensuring jointness when needed.

Conclusion

Theaterisation sounds modern, but tactically it risks weakening all three services. For the Air Force, it cages mobility and wastes scarce squadrons. For the Army, it adds bureaucracy and duplicates resources. For the Navy, it breaks the unity of a naturally mobile force.

India does need greater jointness — but through integration where it makes sense, not by blindly adopting a theater model that doesn’t fit our numbers, geography, or threats. In war, speed, clarity, and concentrated force win battles. Poorly designed theaterisation risks delivering the opposite.

In Simple words

Future hybrid warfare is totally

grey dont fight it with black and white moves which are easy to predict for the foes 😎🇮🇳👍🏻